[Part 1] Are we all complicit? - “The complexities of complicity” in the Poor state of livelihoods of Smallholder Cocoa Farmers
For the past few weeks, I've found myself deeply absorbed in a contemplation of “complicity”, particularly within the cocoa-chocolate industry. This reflection isn't borne out of idle curiosity but is rooted in a personal journey that spans from the cocoa farms of my parents to the academic research corridors, and now, to the narratives I share via the Cocoa Diaries. It's a reflection on how, despite our best intentions, we might unintentionally find ourselves tangled in the very fabric of the problems we aim to undo. The inadequacy of income among smallholder cocoa farmers isn't a simple effect of market dynamics but shaped by historical forces, perpetuating poverty in ways often unseen.
Why, then, do we find ourselves in these complexities of complicity? Is it a lack of awareness, an oversight of our interconnected roles, or perhaps, a deeper, more systemic issue that binds us to this cycle? When I say “us”, I mean us, the cocoa farmer, the writer, the chocolatier, the banker, the governments, regulators, license buying companies, NGOs, etc involved within the cocoa-chocolate industry. I am not looking to point fingers but to provoke thought, strip the layers of complexity that cover our best intentions. To explore the nuances of complicity within the cocoa-chocolate industry, perhaps we can begin to understand the cause and effect of our complicities, and how our actions, however small, contribute to a larger picture.
Historical Context and Present Realities
The difficulty of the cocoa is a story not just of present-day economic hardship but of historical currents that have carved deep inequalities within the global trade landscape.
Consider the open market Ghana e.g. Kejetia in Kumasi, Ghana, where the principle of supply and demand plays out with a semblance of fairness. During plentiful tomato harvest, the farmers and the market women proficiently adjust tomato prices, ensuring survival in the face of perishability. Here, the farmer's voice in pricing negotiations, though constrained by nature's impulses, still finds a whisper of agency when they can choose whom to sell to at what price without policies determining the price they should receive. But what of the cocoa farmer?
The cocoa sector shows a frankly different scene. Here, the ability to negotiate, to assert one's price in the discord of global trade, is silent. The world market, while a vague concept, is ultimately a construct of human design, a system where financialisation of commodities like cocoa traps the very essence of trade in invisible chains. It begs the question: Why does this global marketplace, so influenced by the principle of supply and demand, not extend the same courtesy of negotiation to the cocoa farmer as it does to the local tomato seller and the chocolate manufacturer?
In Ghana, , this disparity is further magnified. The Ghana Cocoa Board, a custodian of the industry, wields a double-edged sword of control and support, seemingly protecting the interests of the farmer while simultaneously dictating the very price that defines their livelihood. This system, apparently designed to buffer against the volatile whims of the global market, paradoxically mirrors the constraints it seeks to alleviate.
Why, then, does this contrast exist? How have historical forces shaped a reality where the local market's dynamism (like the tomato seller experience) is a distant dream for the cocoa farmer, attentive in a global system that denies them the very agency of pricing?
The Ghana Cocoa Board Complicity
The Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) emerges as a figure, embodying a dual role that overlaps regulation and market participation. This positioning is not without its controversies, stirring a pot of ethical and economic dilemmas that question the very essence of its operations. At the heart of this problem lies the issue of pricing – a critical determinant of livelihood for the smallholder cocoa farmer.
Unlike its counterparts in other cocoa-producing nations, where regulatory bodies merely guide farmers with indicative prices, Cocobod takes a more prescriptive approach. By setting a fixed producer price at the season's outset, it effectively removes the negotiating table from the farmer's reach. This pre-determined price, while intended as a shield against the market's volatility, raises probing questions about autonomy and fairness. Why should the international market's invisibility determine the farmer's fate, while a domestic institution replicates a similar, if not more immediate, form of control?
“Why should the international market's invisibility determine the farmer's fate, while a domestic institution replicates a similar, if not more immediate, form of control?”
Cocobod's semi-autonomous nature adds another layer of complexity to this narrative. Apparently, this model should offer flexibility and agility, enabling Cocobod to make decisive interventions in the sector's interest. Yet, this shift from regulator to revenue-driven entity blurs the lines of accountability and purpose. What should be Cocobod's primary focus? Regulation in the public interest or financial self-sustainability? This semi-autonomy, rather than clarifying Cocobod's role, seems to complicate its mission, leaving a trail of questions about its impact on the smallholder farmer's well-being.
Furthermore, the association of Cocobod's operations against the broader public sector creates inconsistency. The smallholder farmer, a cornerstone of Ghana's economy and a contributor to its tax base, finds themselves in a peculiar predicament. While the local tomato seller exercises some degree of pricing autonomy and fulfils their tax obligations, the cocoa farmer is bound by Cocobod's pricing statutes, stripped of the very agency afforded to others within the Ghanaian economy.. This discrepancy begs the question: Why are cocoa farmers, integral to the nation's prosperity, denied the basic economic agency of price negotiation?
Well, I know someone will be shouting “Kwame we have a farmers representative on the producer price setting committee, so stop complaining!!!”. Yes, you are right. How do you expect a farmer who has been explicitly through policy and practice historically till date been disconnected from the global market trade of cocoa, to have and understand the data required for negotiation? I will leave it here.
As Cocobod treads the line between autonomy and regulation, its choices resonate across the cocoa value chain, influencing not just economic outcomes but also the fabric of social justice within the sector. This dual role, coupled with the contentious issue of producer pricing, illuminates a broader dialogue on fairness, autonomy, and the quest for a sustainable future for Ghana's cocoa farmers.
Pension Scheme Analysis
The recent introduction of a pension scheme by the Ghana Cocoa Board for cocoa farmers is signalled as a significant milestone, seemingly ushering in a new chapter of social security for those who labour at the core of the cocoa industry. However, a closer examination shows underlying issues of fairness and sufficiency, casting shadows over the scheme's perceived benefits.
Under this scheme, farmers are expected to allocate 2.5% to 10% of their earnings towards their pension, with Cocobod contributing a modest 1%. Why must smallholder farmers, already affected by economic fragility, bear the primary responsibility for their financial security in old age?
The contrast becomes even more pronounced when compared to the broader public sector, where government employees, Cocobod staff included, receive substantial pension benefits funded by the public purse. This stark difference between the treatment of cocoa farmers and public sector employees raises pressing questions about equity. Is it just that cocoa farmers, whose efforts are foundational to Ghana's prosperity, are left to secure their retirement largely unaided? Off course we cannot overlook Cocoa as a cash crop and how the backs of cocoa farmers in Ghana has been broken to build the early industrialisation agenda before, during and after Ghana’s independence.
The law mandates that employers contribute 13% to their employees' pensions, with employees contributing 5.5%. This legal obligation suggests a de facto employer-employee relationship between Cocobod and the cocoa farmers, challenging Cocobod's current contribution levels. Although cocoa farmers are not explicitly employees of the Ghana Cocoa Board, the nature of their relationship, bound by Cocobod's regulations and policies, effectively places them in a similar position. If they are not Cocobod's employees, why then are they subject to such strict control over their pricing, product sales, and agricultural management practices? Aside cocoa farmers, every farmer in Ghana is free to price and sell their products directly to the buyer and uses the fertilizer they so please atleast within the bounds of the broader national laws.
The pension scheme, although a gesture towards acknowledging the farmers' welfare, inadequately addresses the need for a comprehensive support system. It ignites a debate about fairness, respect, and the appreciation of the labour that sustained and still sustain Ghana and the global chocolate market. By the way why isn’t chocolatiers and other stakeholders downstream contributing to it?
Internal Complicity within Cocoa-Producing Countries
The complicity in the cocoa sector extends beyond the policies of institutions like the Ghana Cocoa Board, it also leak into the very fabric of cocoa-producing communities. Here, the internal dynamics of countries like Ghana, where the legacy of cocoa farming is deeply entrenched, present a complex picture of conflict and compromise. This complexity is exemplified by the individuals within these communities who, driven by the need to survive, find themselves in positions that unintentionally support the status quo—a status quo that perpetuates the challenges faced by smallholder farmers historically and today.
Consider the Ghanaian sustainability officer, or the local managing director of a cocoa processing firm located in Ghana. These individuals, representing entities often owned by Western interests, are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On one hand, their roles demand allegiance to their employers' objectives, objectives that may not always align with the best interests of the local farming communities. On the other hand, they are part of these very communities, acutely aware of the hardships faced by their friends and families who depend on cocoa farming for their livelihood.
This contrast raises critical questions about the nature of complicity.
Is it fair to judge these individuals harshly for their roles in sustaining an industry that, while flawed, provides essential income for many? Can one truly navigate such a position without becoming complicit in the wider issues affecting the cocoa sector?
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